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Introduction This report will explore the status of radical Islamic ideology and its popularity among Egyptians in Cairo today. It stems in part from an October 2007 research trip to gain insights into Salafi-jihadi activism and the political, social and religious climate that either supports or inhibits its growth. That climate in Cairo-gauged by recent public opinion polls, my interviews and observations, and trends among Salafis in Egypt today-does not seem to bode favorably for militant Islamist activism. The city is not a center for this ideology or its movement, partly due to recent economic success, belief in democratic principles and Egyptian Muslims' rejection of violent tactics.
Egypt served as the wellspring for modern Islamism and has had more than a century of evolving Salafi thought and activism. Certainly, foreign-born Muslims and Egyptians alike are well aware of this country's-and especially Cairo's-unique place in contemporary Muslim thought. It has produced some of the most influential Islamist thinkers and organizers of recent history-Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Rida, Hasan alBanna and Sayyid Qutb-who collectively dealt with issues of Islamic reform and revivalism, modeled on Salafi ideals. In recent decades, it has also produced or trained leading jihadi figures such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, 'Abdullah 'Azzam, and 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman. Today, however, the Islamist movement, greatly weakened by crackdowns in the late 1990s, does not pose the same threat it once did to the Egyptian state.
The tension between the city's towering Islamist past and the newfound sense of progress and prosperity creates a duality in Egypt's capital that, for the time being, is a positive sign for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. That is, there is for many a coexistence of Islam and Egyptian nationalism, which is open to the West and often associated with democratic values. The relationship between Egyptian nationalism and Islam also serves, in this sense, as a deterrent to the popularity of jihadists. The jihadi movement depends on the influence of ideologues who legitimize the movement to the Muslim public, and instill the belief that violent opposition to the existing government, or secular rule generally, is a priority for the Muslim community. These ideologues-and the jihadi movement more broadly-are weakened when Muslims view Islam and their own nationalism as being complementary rather than at odds.
On Egyptian television, images of the al-Azhar mosque complex and other picturesque Cairene domes and minarets are routinely juxtaposed against images of the Pharaohs, Pyramids of Giza, and other pre-Islamic symbols of Egyptian national identity. As many Cairenes told me, this is intentional; it aims to forge a national identity where Islam and the Arab Republic of Egypt are in harmony. Perhaps not surprisingly then, jihadi groups operating in Egypt have targeted these very images, attacking tourist destinations associated with pre-Islamic antiquity almost exclusively.
Based on recent patterns, Egyptian Muslims may well favor democracy and development over pan-Islamic resistance and the call to global or local jihad. That relationship will no doubt affect Western counter-terrorism efforts; if Egypt can be a model for Islam and modernity that moves toward gradual democratization, it could substantially weaken the credibility of al-Qa'ida, and Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular. At present, it appears that among most Egyptian Muslims, trends toward jihad are waning.
The Ideological Spectrum
There are a range of Islamic voices in Egypt today, but for the most part, those resonating do not do so based on violent opposition. Through a combination of government censures and Egyptians' rejection of extremism, the most popular Imams preach on individual faith and a platform of co-existence with the West.
Amr Khaled is Egypt's best-known Muslim preacher, described by The New York Times Magazine in 2006 as "the worlds most famous and influential Muslim televangelist." Born in Alexandria, he graduated from Cairo University in 1988, where Ayman al-Zawahiri received his medical degree a decade earlier.
1 His lectures, broadcast on NILESAT, condemn bin Laden while promoting "faith-based While televised preachers like Khaled promote better relations with the West, the clerical establishment of Cairo-the muftis at al-Azhar University-have been called correct pro-jihadist comments and fatwas following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. In early 2003, the chairman of al-Azhar's fatwa committee ruled it was obligatory for Muslims to fight American and British forces in Iraq. 3 The ruling was quickly addres by the state, and Grand Mufti 'Ali Gum'a invalidated any such call for jihad from alAzhar. Moreover, Shaykh Muhammad Tantawi, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, has made a number of public comments condemning suicide bom e Despite some talk of "Crusader" invasions by certain clerics, al-Azhar as an institution remains loyal to the regime. Its leadership positions are appointed by the sta and the clerics are salaried employees of the Egyptian government. These hukumi, or public (state-administered) religious institutions have a history over the recent decades of Islamist strife of cooperating with the state. As such, they are suspect in the eyes of militant Islamists and are so ty Of the six divisions identified, only two are committed to violent change-rad political and isolationist Islamist movements. The other four types, made up of seve different networks, organizations and individuals in Egypt, seek Islamic reform and revival through non-violent means. The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest of these organizations and has been moving towards ever-increasing involvement in the political system in Egypt over recent decades. Yet the Brotherhood's fate hangs in the balance the Mubarak regime, whose aut ical ral as horitarian rule has produced economic gains and stability a region beset with conflicts, continues to crack down on dissidents and suspected membe oing; onal security" for the first time. This comes at the same time in rs of the Brotherhood.
Earlier this year, Egyptian security services launched a crackdown on the Brotherhood that targeted businessmen, Islamic publishers and bookstores, and some senior leadership between Alexandria and Cairo. 6 Such crackdowns have been ong about 1,000 members were detained after the 2005 parliamentary elections (after the Brotherhood won 88 of the 454 seats). The Mubarak regime recently declared the organization a "threat to nati as Mub n government, but it is unclear how such moves will affect the popularity of ther Islamist groups, such as those who espouse violent tactics. At present, however, it democratic political solutions over lamism.
arak's efforts to change several amendments to the constitution, including a ban on religious-based parties. Students from al-Azhar and Cairo University can be seen donning the "traditional" style of dress, the galabiyya-the long robe worn by Muslim men for centuries. During the month of Ramadan, Egyptian Muslims encourage each othe and there is a communal sense of Islam, which is publicly promoted. Among the majority of Egyptians I spoke to-ranging from taxi drivers to state employees to students at the American University o hood had been gaining ground in recent years. At the same time, many young Egyptians were eager to talk about Islam as a religion of peace, and express their disdain for its association with "terrorism."
A survey of public opinion in Islamic countries carried out by Monsoor Moaddel looked at the views of Egyptians towards Islam, religious institutions generally, and views of democracy and the West before and after 9/11. Surprisingly, the survey fou pattern of "Egyptian worldviews in a direction less favorable toward religious institutions, less favorable toward the way the country is run, and more favorable democracy and gender equality" since 9 n ns responded with greater distrust, as reflected in the survey results, where 63% said that "Western cultural invasion was a very serious problem" in the pre-9/11 responses, rising to 71% after 9/11. While the post-9/11 spike in hostility toward the West may be disturbing, necessarily indicative of growing radicalization in Cairo. According to Dr. Jan M of AUC, young Egyptians commonly hold the view that Islam should not be conn terrorism. They are a generation of Egyptian Muslims striving to compete and bring about greater competition and equality in their society, all the while favorable to democratic principles. This was also expressed by the respondents in the survey conducted by Moaddel, who found that "respondents' favorable attitudes toward democracy significantly increased on all indicator w ' increased from 56% before 9/11 to 69% after 9/11." Such findings do sug growing support for democratic principles among Egyptians, a move away from religiously driven approaches to political issues. According to the poll, 58% of Egyptians say relations between Muslims and people in th West are bad, with 56% of those saying that Westerners are mostly to blame, 1% saying Muslims are to blame, and 22% saying Jews are to blame for the negative relations. Another question asking "What is responsible for Muslim nations' lack of e prosperity?" und that Egyptians do think they should be more prosperous, with 59% blaming U.S.
s' ast movement-placed the lame for Muslims' shortcomings on Muslims themselves for failing to adhere to the nt trend toward democratic principles stands in sharp ontrast to Egypt's historical relationship with Salafi Islam. fo and Western policies for their conditions. Yet, the second most popular cause among the respondents was government corruption, followed by lack of democracy.
More than a century earlier in Egyptian society, Western influence and lack of Muslim political and economic success were also key issues of discussion. However, these p 'Abduh's greatest influence was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). In 1880s in Paris, the two published a journal entitled The Indissoluble Bond, and spread their message of Islamist awakening based on a return to the models of the salaf.
11 In doctrinal terms, he was more liberal than present-day Salafis, allowing ijtihad independent interpretation o 12 S valid sources of law, thus enshrining a rigid conservatism and literal interpretation of the texts.
After four years in Paris, 'Abduh returned to Cairo where he served as a judge fo several years before becoming the highest ranking figure at one of Sunni Islam's m p Qutb, 'Abduh and his movement sought gradual reform, and as Grand Mufti o Egypt, his Salafi movement focused on education and da'wa (proselytizing). Al-Banna sought to confront Western influence by mobilizing Muslims towards a (re)awakening of Islamic values and a rejection of secularism. Al-Banna followed in Rida's footsteps in this respect, seeing a societal drift away from Islam as the source of law and societal norms, with "the West," or more accurately European colonialist powers, playing a central role in this process of Islamic decline.
Early in the Muslim Brotherhood's history, political and social mobilization w of primary concern to al-Bann n on the Brotherhood. In 1932, al-Banna, who had founded the organization from the Suez Canal city of Isma'iliyya, decided to relocate to Cairo, where he incorporated a Islamic society led by one of his brothers. 15 It soon began publishing its first we newsletter and by 1938 had grown to have three hundred branches and an estimated 50,000-150,000 members. 16 From the 1930s to the 1950s, the organization continued to grow rapidly, initially as an apolitical movement dedicated to religious revival and reform. By the 1940s the organization gravitated toward political dissent, leveling criticism at the Britis administration in control of the country in newsletters and at rallies. The campus-based groups grew across Egypt in the early 1970s. Their primary agenda was social reform from the ground up-attempting to enforce individual morality with activism sometimes resembling vigilantism. 24 These Islamist groups were oriented around social change, but also regime change, increasingly turning towards armed resistance in their drive to implement Islamic law in the country. This period proved to be a formative one for Islamist militancy in Egypt.
Two militant Islamist organizations emerged in the late 1970s that would become Egypt's primary security concern for next two decades. Both coalesced around former radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Jihad, or al-Jihad al-Islami (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ) and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) began as alliance various groups and leaders that had been affiliated with the Brotherhood. Both sought to replace the secular Egyptian regime with Islamic rule.
Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam al-Faraj was inspire p Islamic nation. Faraj clashed with another rising militant Islamist group, Takfir wa'l-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration) led by Shukri Mustafa, seeing them literally flee in the face of confrontation with the enemy. For Faraj-as he laid out in h best-known work, al-Farida al-Ghayba, or "The Neglected Duty"-armed jihad had been neglected by Muslims, and must be renewed and understood as an obligation for every believer, like fasting, prayer and almsgiving. 29 Another future al-Qaida figure who was at odds with the Egyptian government, Saif al-Adel, was arrested in 1987 in Cairo for attempting to revive the EIJ. 30 At his trial, the government accused him of plotting to set off simultaneous bombings at the Egyptian Parliament building in a bid to demolish it.
With various leaders and divisions over the late 1980s, IG and EIJ did share members and coordinate attacks. In 1995, during the height of the two groups' militant campaign to unseat the Egyptian gov H of IG leaders were forced to issue public renunciations of violence, and thei leader, 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman-despite terrorist attacks intended to free himlanguished in a New York state prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center attac In 2006 IG's senior leader Nageh Ibrahim reiterated the group's disavowal of violence on al-Arabiya television.
The two dominant Islamist movements of the 1970s and 80s in Egypt were hierarchical, structured organizations, made up of former Brotherhood members who resisted involvement in the political system and campus-based Salafi p t. They succeeded in carrying out a series of significant attacks in the country, the assassination of Anwar Sadat chief among them, as well as numerous operations against popular tourist sites that damaged Egypt's economy. But ultimately the Egyptia government succeeded in dismantling them, exiling or silencing their leaders, while in turn marring the image of such militant Islamists among Egyptians. The Luxor attack in November 1997 marked a turning point for Egyptian Isla militants, when IG, headed by imprisoned cleric 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, carri a opened fire on a tour bus, killing more than 60 tourists. 31 The attackers hoped t win the release of 'Abd al-Rahman from prison. This attack came after a five-year long campaign of terrorist attacks, primarily IG gunmen shooting down tourists in dozens o separate operations. The attack also coincided with the trial of 65 members of IG Cairo. Adding to the significance of the event in Egypt's history with terrorism, th Egyptian government maintained that Usama bin Ladin financed the attack. 32 positionist Islamist militants, and swift measures quieted terrorism in the cou for the following years. By not only clamping down on the militant groups, but also engaging in negotiations with selected 'moderate' leadership, IG was effectively sidelined as an organized force.
33 With 'Abd al-Rahman still imprisoned, and its remaining leadership issuing denunciations of violence, the organization posed little further threat to Egypt's security.
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For the next seven years, Egypt saw virtually no militant activity; certainly nothing on the scale of the 1990s. However, two attacks in 2004 broke that silence. Th denials of responsibility from the prominent Egyptian jihad groups-IG and EIJmarked yet another transition in the ongoing conflict between Islamist groups and the Egyptian government, as the old guard had been replaced by new groups, fulfilling 31 "Tourists massacred at temple," BBC News, November 17, 1997. 32 Barbara Plett, "Bin Laden 'behind Luxor massacre'," BBC News, May 13, 1999. 35 T following year, another bombing targeting foreign tourists was carried out in Dahab, in April, killing 23 people.
Notably, the latest wave of mujahidin groups has used new tactics. Rather than ambushing tourists with machine guns, the groups that carried out the attacks from 2004 2006 relied for the most part on explosives, and in some cases suicide bombers. Among the groups to claim responsibility for the various attacks were the 'Abdullah 'Azzam Brigades, the Mujahidin of Egypt, and Tawhid and Jihad Group of Egypt-all previo obscure groups. The 2005 attacks in Cairo were also the first instance of Islamist militancy in Egypt's capital for the past seven years. In the April 30 attack, two veile women opened fire on foreigners in al-Tahrir square in downtown Cairo, adjacent t American University campus. One man strapped with explosives-the fian th ober 6 bridge and detonated the device. Police say these attackers (who wounded nine, and were themselves killed by police) were tied to the somewhat crude bombs constructed out of nails and other shrapnel that detonated at Khan al-Khalili bazaar, frequented by tourists, three weeks earlier. 36 That attack killed three foreigners, one American and two French, as well as the suicide bomber. These attacks were also claimed by the 'Abdullah 'Azzam Brigades and the Mujahidin of Egypt.
The Egyptian government continued to crack down on suspected militant groups, although little evidence tied to the Sinai attacks was produced. One of the jihadi grou targeted and dismantled was al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura (the Victorious Sect), accused of planning attacks on tourist sites and assassinations of Muslim and Christian figures in the country. 37 Yet the dismantling of small groups like al-Ta'ifa do not trated. That group also claimed responsibility for the second significant attack tourists, on July 23, 2005, at Sharm al-Sheikh. 38 In that operation, 88 people were k and another 200 wounded when the Ghazala Gardens Hotel and a market were hit in coordinated bombings. The Brigades posted a claim of responsibility on an Islamist w forum, stating that the attacks were in response to the "crimes of worldwide evil powe in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Chechnya.
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Two points stand out about the Brigades and the series of bombing on tour rs" ist sorts over 2004-05. These bombings were better-planned-with two suicide car -and resulted in mass casualties, at the same time reating greater damage to the Egyptian tourism industry. Second, assuming that the lamist to Contem re bombings and one timed explosive c relatively-unknown group was in fact responsible for the attacks, as appears to be the case, they cite international grievances against Muslims, invoking the pan-Is agenda of al-Qa'ida. This would put added pressure on the Egyptian government defend against transnational threats in addition to countering internal resistance.
porary Salafism in Egypt
The Salafi model for social change and Islamic renewal continues in a variety of forms in Egypt, and in the majority of cases it is moved forward by groups with nonconfrontational agendas. Current strains in Egyptian Salafi thinking appear to be dominated by doctrinal issues and scholarly debate rather than political or social action.
at all.
Abd ne and how it should be efined. This practice, known as jarh wa 'l-ta'dil (Refutation and revision, e.g., internal Salafi c in Daniel Maldonado, the American-born convert who traveled to Egypt to deepen knowle h, Maldonado gives the impression that Cairene Salafis in particular are An example of this is found on the SalafMisr website, which hosts several discussions of more militant Salafis, such as the campaign in Somalia against Ethiopia, but has no in-depth information on such power struggles within Egypt, if they exist The sense is that for most of these groups, instilling a literal and strict adherence on issues of faith and doctrine-and expounding on them at length-takes precedence over organized or militant Islamist activity.
Hasan bin 'Abd al-Wahhab Marzuq al-Banna, Abu Muhammad Khalid bin ' al-Rahman, Khalid 'Uthman and others with local followings and distributed on Islamist web forums, discuss particular aspects of the Salafi doctri d hallenges over various doctrinal issues), often frustrates Islamists who seek unity and action for the Islamic nation. For example, an essay from another Egyptian Salafi shaykh, Muhammad Sa'id Raslan, reads "Is this from the Salafiyya?! Our doctrine regarding Divine Judgment and Destiny," and provides a lengthy discussion on the "proper" Salafi view toward such matters. 40 Yet these tracts generally avoid engaging political issues or confronting Egypt's secular authority.
dge of Islam and who eventually received training with mujahidin in Somalia, describes such groups in one of his online postings (comparing study in Cairo and Alexandria). Terming them "neo-salafis," he describes how a local Alexandria Shayk Muhammad Isma'eel, expelled them from the mosque for bringing the bickering and discord of Cairo. Maldonado appears to have sat for the lectures of Muhammad Isma'il alMuqaddam, a well-known Salafi da'i (missionary), who was born and continues his wo in Alexandria. Daniel and other participants on the Islamicnetworking.com forum discussed Shaykh Muhammad Isma'il, and he was held in high esteem as one who refrained from the partisan bickering common to Salafi groups. 43 Muhammad Isma'il does routinely criticize the Shi'a (one speech he gave was entitled, "Shi`a: People o in are primarily concerned with spreading their interpretation of Islam-the of Salafi Islam more specifically. While they may weigh in on political affairs and matters of authority, they are not necessarily a recruitment hub for radicalizing Muslims. Daniel Maldonado, in all likelihood, met individuals in the Islamic community in Alexandria that put him in contact with more militant elements attached to jihadi efforts in Somalia.
Arrested by Kenyan authorities after he fled from Kismaayo, he told his interviewers that he left Egypt to participate in the jihad in Somalia, describing it as "raising the w a the Somali militia, and that turned into fighting the Ethiopians, and if Americans came, I would fight them too." According to transcripts presented by the FBI in th criminal complaint, he also said he would "kill other Muslims, in an attack, if they were apostates and not faithful Muslims." This statement contradicted his earlier postings criticizing takfir, as he was apparently now willing to kill fellow Muslims for religious deviations.
Maldonado's route to jihad in fact began in the United States and online, and wa continu p depicted by S H doctrines of the Salafiyya, and he sought out such instruction in Alexandria. After a yea there, Maldonado moved toward more militant Salafi activists, ultimately finding his way to an al-Qa'ida-linked training camp in Somalia after leaving Alexandria in November 2006. learn a lot from the Islamic schools there in egypt, but you cant practise 2/3rds your belief. Its mostly a hush hush stay away from Jihad, politics...[sic]" The writer went on to advise study in northern Sudan, Yemen, or northern Pakistan. This sentiment-of pressure on suspected militant activist groups and their inability to opera in Egypt-was confirmed by the author's field work as well as the recent history of Islamists' relations with the Mubarak regime.
Conclusion
l Islam is suppressed. With widespread crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood and suspected jihadists, terrorist groups have been driven to the margins. While Islamist books could be found in Cairo bookstores and street vendors, militant Salafi literature was the exception rather than the rule. In Alexandria, one finds more committed Sala groups, like that in which Daniel Maldonado participated, but they do not publicly condone militancy.
Since Egypt is a destination for Islamic learning and thought more than an active front for jihad, the trends in ideology and militancy can-and have been-influential on Islamist movements worldwide. One encounters committed Islamist groups in Egyp those endorsing violence have been forced underground. The current lack of popular support for or involvement in jihadi groups in Egypt could negatively affect mujahidin efforts in the Arab world more broadly, given Egypt's place in Islamist history. to th Egyptian, it will stifle the century-plus tradition of Salafi activism in Egypt-and could present a counterweight to Salafi-jihadi groups globally. With aims for democracy an e su T A
